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NASA V. NELSON:  
THE HIGH COURT FLYING HIGH  
ABOVE THE RIGHT TO  
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
Blythe Golay* 
In 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court first acknowledged a potential 
constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters.” Since then, the Court has remained silent on whether there is 
a right to informational privacy. In the October 2010 term, the Court 
had another chance to revisit the contours of this potential privacy 
interest in NASA v. Nelson. But it again refused to define those 
contours and instead assumed, without deciding, that a constitutional 
right to informational privacy exists. The Court held that although 
information that was collected from an employee background-check 
questionnaire implicated the employees’ putative right to informational 
privacy, the Privacy Act of 1974 alleviated that privacy concern by 
providing sufficient protection that prevents the nonconsensual 
dissemination of information. This Comment argues that, in its reliance 
on the Privacy Act, the Court improperly ignored the distinction 
between compelled collection of information and dissemination of 
information—and how both threaten a right to informational privacy. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution does not expressly mention a right of 
privacy.1 But the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the 
Constitution creates certain “zones of privacy.”2 With respect to a 
right to informational privacy, in 1977 the Court first acknowledged 
a potential constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”3 In two cases—Whalen v. Roe4 and Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services
5—the Court assumed, without 
deciding, that the Constitution protects an informational privacy 
interest.6 In both Whalen and Nixon, it held that whatever the limits 
of that interest were, the statutes at issue did not unconstitutionally 
invade the interest.7 More than thirty years later, the Court in 
National Aeronautics & Space Administration v. Nelson
8 (“Nelson”) 
took the same approach and assumed, without deciding,9 that a 
constitutional right to informational privacy exists—only to then 
hold that a public employer who conducted an employee background 
check did not violate that right.10 In so holding, the Court reasoned 
that the Privacy Act of 197411 (the “Privacy Act”) afforded sufficient 
protections against public dissemination, such that the challenged 
background check did not violate contract employees’ (the 
“Employees”) informational privacy interest.12 
 
 1.  Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). 
 2.  Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)). 
 3.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589, 599 (1977). 
 4.  429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 5.  433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 6.  Id. at 457–58; Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598–600. 
 7.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457 (holding that a statute that required former President Nixon to 
submit papers and recordings was constitutional); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 603–04 (holding that a 
statute that required collection of drug-prescription information was constitutional). 
 8.  131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 9.  Id. at 751 (“We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right 
of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon.”). 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 12.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 751 (“The Government’s interest as employer . . . , combined with 
the protections against public dissemination provided by the Privacy Act . . . satisfy any ‘interest 
in avoiding disclosure’ that may ‘arguably ha[ve] its roots in the Constitution.’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599, 605)). 
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This Comment explores Nelson and argues that the Court should 
not have held that the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the 
Employees’ informational privacy interest. Part II discusses the 
procedural history and facts of Nelson. Part III describes the Court’s 
reasoning in holding that the background check, in light of the 
Privacy Act’s protections, did not violate a putative right to 
informational privacy.13 Part IV argues that the “interest in avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters,” that was first articulated in Whalen,14 
encompasses both the Employees’ disclosure to NASA (the 
“Government”)—collection of information—and the Government’s 
disclosure to the public—dissemination of information.15 While the 
Court chose to focus only on the latter,16 both disclosures threaten an 
informational privacy interest, and the Privacy Act is inadequate to 
protect either. 
II.  STATEMENT OF  
THE CASE 
The background check at issue in Nelson consisted of two form 
questionnaires: Standard Form 85 (“SF-85”) and the Investigative 
Request for Personal Information, Form 42 (“Form 42”).17 SF-85 
seeks, in addition to basic biographical information,18 information on 
whether the individual “used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured 
illegal drugs” in the last year.19 If the individual answers 
affirmatively, he or she must provide information about “any 
treatment or counseling received.”20 Upon completion of SF-85, the 
Government sends Form 42 to the individual’s current and former 
landlords and references listed in SF-85.21 Form 42 then asks the 
 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. 
 15.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Respondents 
at 21–22, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 3183846, at *21–22 [hereinafter EFF 
Brief]. 
 16.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 761–63. 
 17.  Id. at 752–53; Form 42, EDITTHIS.INFO, http://editthis.info/images/jpl_rebadging/e/ec/ 
Opm_form_inv_42.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for Non-
Sensitive Positions, U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT. (Sept. 1995), http://www.opm.gov/forms/ 
pdf_fill/SF85.pdf. 
 18.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
 19.  Standard Form 85, Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, supra note 17, at 5 
(question fourteen). 
 20.  Id.; see Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
 21.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
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references open-ended questions bearing on the individual’s 
“honesty and trustworthiness.”22 It also asks whether the references 
know of any “adverse information” concerning “violations of law,” 
“financial integrity,” “abuse of alcohol and/or drugs,” “mental or 
emotional stability,” “general behavior or conduct,” or “other 
matters.”23 If the references answer affirmatively, Form 42 calls for 
an explanation.24 
Following an initiative by the 9/11 Commission,25 the 
Government informed the Employees that they had to complete the 
background-check process.26 Any employee who failed to complete 
the process before the deadline faced termination of employment.27 
The Employees subsequently filed suit, alleging that the background 
check violated their constitutional right to informational privacy.28 
The Employees then moved for a preliminary injunction, less than 
two weeks before the background-check deadline, on the basis that 
the Government would fire them if they refused to submit to the 
background check.29 The district court denied the request,30 but the 
Ninth Circuit subsequently granted a temporary injunction pending 
appeal.31 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged, and the Employees conceded, 
that most of the background check questions were “unproblematic 
and [did] not implicate the constitutional right to informational 
privacy.”32 The court went on, however, to conclude that the district 
court erred in holding that the Employees were not likely to succeed 
 
 22.  Form 42, supra note 17. 
 23.  Id.; see Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
 24.  Form 42, supra note 17. 
 25.  Since its creation, NASA has used a background-check process for federal, but not 
contract, employees. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 752. This distinction changed in 2004, when the 9/11 
Commission prompted President George W. Bush “to order new, uniform identification standards 
for ‘[f]ederal employees,’ including ‘contractor employees.’” Id. (citing George W. Bush, 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-12—Policy for a Common Identification 
Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Aug. 27, 
2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=64578#axzz1ZZ0DTHD7). Thereafter, the 
Department of Commerce implemented that initiative by “mandating that contract employees 
with long-term access to federal facilities complete a standard background check . . . .” Id. 
 26.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 752. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 512 F.3d 1134, 1141 (9th Cir.), vacated, 
530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Nelson v. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 506 F.3d 713, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 32.  Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878. 
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on their privacy claim.33 As to SF-85, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
compelled disclosure of information about treatment or counseling 
for drug problems did not further the Government’s interest in 
“uncovering and addressing illegal substance abuse” among the 
Employees.34 To the contrary, the court noted, any treatment or 
counseling that the Employees received for illegal drug use arguably 
weakened the Government’s interest regarding drug problems.35 The 
Ninth Circuit further held that the open-ended questions on Form 42 
were not narrowly tailored to meet the Government’s interests in 
verifying the Employees’ identities and ensuring security at the 
Government’s facilities.36 Although the open-ended questions might 
have solicited some information that was relevant to the 
Government’s interests, because they were not narrowly tailored, 
they likely violated the Employees’ informational privacy interest.37 
The Supreme Court reversed.38 Relying heavily on the Privacy 
Act’s nondisclosure requirement39 and the reasoning of Whalen and 
Nixon, the Court held that the Government’s inquiries in SF-85 and 
Form 42 did not violate a constitutional right to informational 
privacy.40 
III.  REASONING OF  
THE COURT 
The issue in Nelson was twofold. First, assuming that an 
individual admits to having “used, possessed, supplied, or 
 
 33.  Id. at 879 (“Because SF 85 appears to compel disclosure of personal medical 
information for which the government has failed to demonstrate a legitimate state interest, [the 
Employees] are likely to succeed on this—albeit narrow—portion of their informational privacy 
challenge to SF 85.”). First, a merits panel reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction; then, 
the panel vacated its opinion to file a superseding opinion. Nelson, 512 F.3d 1134. 
 34.  Nelson, 530 F.3d at 878–79. 
 35.  Id. at 879. 
 36.  Id. at 880. While the Government’s interests were legitimate, the questions were not 
narrowly tailored: 
[T]he form invites the recipient to reveal any negative information of which he or she 
is aware. It is difficult to see how the vague solicitation of derogatory information 
concerning the applicant’s “general behavior or conduct” and “other matters” could be 
narrowly tailored to meet any legitimate need, much less the specific interests that [the 
Government] ha[s] offered to justify the new requirement. 
Id. at 881. 
 37.  Id. at 881. 
 38.  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2011). 
 39.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2006). 
 40.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763–64. 
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manufactured illegal drugs” in the last year, does the Government’s 
requirement41 that the individual then provide information on 
treatment or counseling violate a putative right to informational 
privacy, despite the Privacy Act’s protections?42 Second, if that 
forced inquiry does not violate a putative right, does a follow-up, 
open-ended question—concerning the honesty and truthfulness of, or 
adverse information about, the individual43—violate a putative right, 
despite the Privacy Act’s protections? 
Justice Alito, writing for the unanimous Court,44 held no on 
both. The questions that were included in the background check, in 
conjunction with the Privacy Act’s safeguards against nonconsensual 
disclosure, did not violate the Employees’ putative right to 
informational privacy.45 In arriving at its decision, the Court began 
by reviewing Whalen and Nixon.46 Whalen held that a New York 
statute, which permitted the recording of names and addresses of 
individuals who obtained certain drugs with a doctor’s prescription, 
did not violate physicians’ and patients’ putative right to 
informational privacy.47 Similarly, Nixon held that a statute, which 
permitted the custody and screening of the former president’s 
materials, did not unconstitutionally invade his putative right to 
informational privacy.48 
Adhering to the approach of those cases, the Court in Nelson 
“assume[d] for present purposes that the Government’s challenged 
inquiries implicate[d] a privacy interest of constitutional 
 
 41.  The Employees had no meaningful choice of whether to refuse to submit to collection. 
The background-check requirement left the Employees with a choice to surrender either their 
privacy rights or their jobs. Brief for the Respondents at 56, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 
2010 WL 3048324, at *56 (“Respondents ‘are entitled, like all other persons, to the benefit of the 
Constitution,’ and the government may not force them to choose ‘between surrendering their 
constitutional rights or their jobs.’” (quoting Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass’n v. Comm’r of 
Sanitation of N.Y., 392 U.S. 280, 284–85 (1968))). 
 42.  Brief for the Petitioners at I, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 2031410, 
at *I. 
 43.  See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. 
 44.  The vote was 8–0, but the Justices differed on the reasoning. Justice Scalia and Justice 
Thomas wrote concurring opinions. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 769 
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case 
because of her prior work on it as President Obama’s solicitor general. Bob Egelko, Court: Feds 
Can Pry into NASA Scientists’ Lives, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 21, 2011, at C-2. 
 45.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756–57. 
 46.  Id. at 751. 
 47.  Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 591 (1977). 
 48.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 465 (1977). 
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significance.”49 Although Justices Scalia and Thomas—who wrote 
separate concurrences—urged the majority to hold that a 
constitutional right to informational privacy does not exist, the Court 
declined to provide a definitive answer.50 Instead, the Court 
evaluated the Government’s interest in collecting the information and 
determined that the Privacy Act’s protections shielded any privacy 
interest at stake.51 Although the Court assumed that an informational 
privacy right exists, it nevertheless found that the Government had a 
strong interest in conducting the background check because 
investigations of the Employees aided the Government in 
“employing a competent, reliable workforce.”52 Thus, the Court 
declined to interfere with the Government’s workplace decisions 
because the Government—as an employer—had a strong interest in 
managing its internal operations by conducting background checks.53 
Next, the Court examined whether SF-85 and Form 42 furthered 
the Government’s interest in managing its internal operations.54 The 
Court held that SF-85’s inquiry into drug treatment and counseling 
was a permissible follow-up question that furthered the 
Government’s interest, because “[l]ike any employer, the 
Government is entitled to have its projects staffed by reliable, law-
abiding persons who will ‘efficiently and effectively’ discharge their 
duties.”55 Regarding Form 42, the Court held that the open-ended 
questions were “reasonably aimed at identifying capable employees 
who will faithfully conduct the Government’s business.”56 Therefore, 
the questions furthered the Government’s interest57—especially in 
light of employers’ pervasive use of Form 42.58 
Finally, the Court examined the protections that the Privacy Act 
established and the extent to which those protections safeguarded the 
Employees’ putative right to informational privacy.59 The Court held 
that although the Privacy Act provides for exceptions to the 
 
 49.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756. 
 50.  Id. at 756 n.10. 
 51.  Id. at 759, 761. 
 52.  Id. at 758. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 759. 
 55.  Id. at 759–60. 
 56.  Id. at 761. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. (“Form 42 alone is sent out by the Government over 1.8 million times annually.”). 
 59.  Id. at 762. 
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nondisclosure requirement, this was insufficient to show that the 
Privacy Act failed to protect the Employees’ privacy interest.60 In 
particular, the routine-use exception61—which allows for the 
disclosure of information to the Employees’ references and to 
authorized NASA employees who review the form for completion—
did not create “any undue risk of public dissemination.”62 
Because the background check’s inquiries were reasonable and 
employment-related in light of the Government’s interest in 
managing its internal operations, and because the Privacy Act’s 
nondisclosure requirement provided sufficient protection to the 
Employees’ informational privacy interest, the Court held that the 
Government’s background check did not violate a putative 
constitutional right to informational privacy.63 
IV.  THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE HELD THAT  
THE PRIVACY ACT SUFFICIENTLY PROTECTS  
THE EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 
The Privacy Act of 197464 was a determining factor in the 
Court’s decision to uphold the constitutionality of the background 
check. The Privacy Act applied to all of the information that the 
Government collected during its background-check process.65 The 
Court relied on the Privacy Act in reasoning that “the information 
collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’”66 
Thus, although the information that the background check collected 
implicated the Employees’ right to informational privacy, the Court 
reasoned that the Privacy Act alleviated that privacy concern by 
providing sufficient protection that prevented the nonconsensual 
dissemination of the Employees’ personal information.67 
The Court’s reliance on the Privacy Act was flawed because it 
glossed over an important, yet subtle, distinction: the right to privacy 
is threatened by both the collection of information and the 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2006). 
 62.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763. 
 63.  Id. at 763–64. 
 64.  5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
 65.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753 (“All responses to SF-85 and Form 42 are subject to the 
protections of the Privacy Act.”). 
 66.  Id. at 762 (alteration in original) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)). 
 67.  Id. at 763. 
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dissemination of that information.68 But the Court in Nelson was 
prepared to address only the privacy interest that was implicated by 
the dissemination of information.69 That raises the question: did the 
Privacy Act sufficiently protect the Employees’ privacy interest that 
was implicated by the collection of information? 
A.  Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974 
 and Its Routine-Use Exception 
The Privacy Act regulates the federal government’s use of 
personal information by placing limitations on the collection, 
dissemination, and use of personal information in a system of 
records.70 The Privacy Act allows an agency to maintain a system of 
records that contains information about an individual that is “relevant 
and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency” that is 
authorized by law.71 The goal of the Privacy Act is “to strike a 
delicate balance between the government’s need to gather and to use 
personal information and the individual’s competing need to 
maintain control over such personal information.”72 Thus, although 
the Privacy Act permits an agency to maintain a system of records, it 
also focuses on protecting individuals and their personal 
information.73 
 
 68.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36, 38 (“The distinction between 
government collection and dissemination of private information is not irrelevant to the analysis 
whether the government’s actions are constitutional.”); Brief Amici Curiae for the Respondents at 
17, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 2010 WL 3167310, at *17 (“The Privacy Act only limits 
disclosure by the government; it does nothing to mitigate the privacy concerns raised by 
collection of the information in the first place. Thus, it is not coextensive with the right to 
informational privacy.”). 
 69.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[The Employees] . . . attack only the Government’s 
collection of information on SF-85 and Form 42. And here, no less than in Whalen and Nixon, the 
information collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’”). 
 70.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVACY ACT: OMB LEADERSHIP NEEDED TO 
IMPROVE AGENCY COMPLIANCE 5 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d03304.pdf. 
 71.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2006); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762. 
 72.  Todd Robert Coles, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An 
Examination of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 965 (1991). For a brief but 
informative discussion on the history of events that led up to the enactment of the Privacy Act, 
see HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE PRIVACY ACT: EMERGING ISSUES AND 
RELATED LEGISLATION 1–4 (2002), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/ 
rl30824.pdf. 
 73.  Indeed, the legislative history indicates that the Privacy Act’s “purpose . . . is to provide 
certain safeguards for an individual against an invasion of personal privacy.” Privacy Act of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1986, 1905–09, amended by Pub. L. No. 95-38, § 5(g), 91 
Stat. 179 (1977). Some scholars suggest that the reason behind this dual, competing purpose was 
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At the heart of the Privacy Act’s protection of individuals is its 
prohibition against the nonconsensual disclosure of personal 
information.74 This requires that an individual give written consent 
before an agency may disclose records that contain information 
about the individual.75 This prohibition, however, is subject to many 
exceptions that permit nonconsensual disclosure.76 Once an agency 
determines that a disclosure falls under one of the twelve exceptions 
to the Privacy Act, the agency only needs to keep a record of the 
“date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure” and the “name and 
address of the person or agency to whom the disclosure is made.”77 
Thus, the burden on agencies to establish exceptions to the 
nondisclosure requirement is quite low.78 
The most contested exception in Nelson was the routine-use 
exception.79 The routine-use exception allows for the nonconsensual 
disclosure of information if the agency determines that disclosure is 
“compatible with the purpose for which [the information] was 
collected.”80 An agency must publish in the federal register81—and 
 
a struggle between the House of Representatives and the Senate to reach a compromise. Coles, 
supra note 72, at 970. The House wanted to facilitate the transfer of information among federal 
agencies, while the Senate wanted to protect individuals by encouraging private enforcement and 
greater remedies. Id. at 970–73. 
 74.  “No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any 
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written request 
by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .” 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(b); see Coles, supra note 72, at 959. 
 75.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762. 
 76.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12). 
 77.  Id. § 552a(c)(1). 
 78.  Brief of Amici Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) and Legal Scholars 
and Technical Experts in Support of the Respondents at 25, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530), 
2010 WL 3167308, at *25 [hereinafter EPIC Brief]. 
 79.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3); Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762; see also Coles, supra note 72, at 975–
77 (discussing the legislative history of the routine-use exception and the compromise between 
the House and Senate). The routine-use exception is one of the “most commonly abused 
provisions of the Privacy Act.” The Privacy Act of 1974, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 
http://epic.org/privacy/1974act/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2011). The Employees in Nelson did not 
seriously contest the other eleven exceptions, although it is interesting to note that in previous, 
unrelated litigation, other plaintiffs alleged that NASA relied on those exceptions. E.g., Henson v. 
Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1145 (6th Cir. 1994) (dealing with the system 
of records exception, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)). 
 80.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7); see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 5 n.6; 
Coles, supra note 72, at 959. 
 81.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D). 
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must inform each individual from whom it collects information82—
the routine uses for which the information may be disseminated.83 
The Government’s system of records that it filed with the federal 
registrar indicated multiple routine uses, two of which were critical 
in Nelson: (1) disclosure when it requested information; and (2) 
disclosure of the information that it collected.84 Thus, under the 
routine-use exception, the Government could have disclosed 
information in the Employees’ background checks when either (1) 
disclosure was necessary to obtain information for a decision that 
concerned the hiring or retention of the Employees; or (2) disclosure 
was necessary to provide information to a federal agency, if that 
agency requested it, regarding the hiring or retention of the 
Employees.85 Essentially, this allowed the Government to disclose 
information to (1) the Employees’ former landlords and references 
who filled out Form 42, to allow them to identify the employee;86 
and (2) other employees who reviewed SF-85, to verify that the 
Employees provided all of the requested information.87 
B.  The Privacy Act Does Not Adequately  
Protect the Right to Informational  
Privacy That Is Threatened by the  
Compelled Collection of Information
88
 
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the Privacy Act shielded 
the Employees’ information from unwarranted dissemination.89 What 
the Court did not address, however, was whether the Privacy Act 
protected a right to informational privacy that was threatened by the 
 
 82.  SF-85 put the Employees on notice of the Government’s routine uses. Brief for the 
Respondents, supra note 41, at 43. The information in SF-85 was different, however, from that 
which the Government submitted to the Federal Register. EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 26–27. 
Moreover, Form 42 did not list the routine uses. Id. 
 83.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(3)(C). 
 84.  National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Notice of Proposed Revisions 
to an Existing Privacy Act System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 45859-02, 45862 (proposed revision 
Aug. 10, 2006) [hereinafter NASA Notice of Proposed Revisions] (listing the routine uses in 
Appendix B). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 753, 763 (2011). 
 87.  Id. at 763. 
 88.  Recall that the Employees essentially had no meaningful choice regarding whether to 
submit to the background-check process. See supra note 41. 
 89.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 761–63 (discussing the statutory protection of unwarranted 
disclosure). 
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collection of information itself.90 The Privacy Act does not 
adequately protect against a threat to the right to informational 
privacy like the one that was implicated by the background checks’ 
compelled collection of information,91 and the Court should not have 
glossed over the distinction between collection and dissemination.92 
That the collection of personal information implicates a privacy 
interest has been clear since the Privacy Act’s beginnings. Congress 
was influenced by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on 
Automated Personal Data Systems and that committee’s 1973 
report,93 which set forth a “Code of Fair Information Practices.”94 
That code listed five principles, and Congress in turn refined the five 
principles to eight—each of which exists in the Privacy Act’s 
requirements.95 One of the eight principles stated, “There shall be 
limits on the types of information an organization may collect about 
an individual . . . .”96 This principle was distinct from another: 
“There shall be limits on the external disclosures of information 
about an individual a record-keeping organization may make.”97 
Thus, Congress intended for the actions—collection and 
 
 90.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 43 (“[T]he Privacy Act—which as relevant 
here limits only dissemination, and not collection, of personal information . . . .”). 
 91.  Moreover, while the Privacy Act does provide measures that protect against the 
nonconsensual dissemination of information, even those measures are inadequate to protect 
against threats to a right to privacy. See infra Part IV.C. 
 92.  Perhaps the lack of discussion of why collection of information implicates a privacy 
right was one way for the Court to narrow the scope of the putative right to informational 
privacy—a narrowing that the Court might have preferred given the lack of precedent on the 
scope of such a right. See EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 20; see also The Supreme Court, 2010 
Term—Leading Cases, 125 HARV. L. REV. 231, 239 (2011) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (“It 
makes sense that in an area with murkier law, and with a right that has more widely felt practical 
implications, the Court would continue to be wary of a broad ruling’s likelihood ‘to go wrong.’” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 93.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS 
OF CITIZENS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL 
DATA SYSTEM viii (1973), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/DATACNCL/1973privacy/ 
tocprefacemembers.htm. 
 94.  PRIVACY PROT. STUDY COMM’N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY: 
THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 501 (1977), available at 
http://epic.org/privacy/ppsc1977report/c13.htm. 
 95.  Id. at 501–02. 
 96.  This is known as the Collection Limitation Principle. Id. at 502. 
 97.  This is known as the Disclosure Limitation Principle. Id. 
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dissemination—to be distinct, yet of comparable significance, for the 
Privacy Act’s requirements.98 
Moreover, both Whalen and Nixon drew a distinction between 
collection and dissemination of information—recognizing that 
although dissemination is often more intrusive and more likely than 
collection is to rise to a violation of the right to informational 
privacy, collection of sensitive information can, by itself, constitute 
an impermissible invasion of privacy.99 Although the two cases 
distinguished between collection and dissemination, neither case 
expressly limited the right to informational privacy to situations that 
exclusively involve dissemination.100 
For example, Whalen stated that individuals have an “interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.”101 And Whalen 
acknowledged that someone can protect that interest either by 
refusing to disclose personal information to the collection agency or 
by requiring the collection agency to guard the information carefully 
to prevent disclosure to the public.102 Indeed, Whalen noted that 
“[r]equir[ed] . . . disclosure[] to representatives of the State”—the 
collection of information—implicates a privacy interest.103 Whalen 
then hinted that compelled collection might, but does not 
automatically, amount to an invasion of privacy.104 Moreover, in first 
 
 98.  See generally Haeji Hong, Dismantling the Private Enforcement of the Privacy Act of 
1974: Doe v. Chao, 38 AKRON L. REV. 71, 80–83 (2005) (summarizing the principles and history 
behind the Privacy Act). 
 99.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37. Other courts have similarly reached 
the conclusion that the collection of information implicates a right to informational privacy. Id. at 
39 n.18 (listing cases). For example, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the right to information 
privacy “applies both when an individual chooses not to disclose highly sensitive information to 
the government and when an individual seeks assurance that such information will not be made 
public.” Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 789–90 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.24 (1977)); accord Shuman v. City of Phila., 470 F. Supp. 
449, 458 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (“If there is a constitutionally protected ‘zone-of-privacy’, compelled 
disclosure in and of itself may be an invasion of that zone, and therefore, a violation of protected 
rights. Absent a strong countervailing state interest, disclosure of private matters should not be 
compelled.”). 
 100.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36. 
 101.  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599. 
 102.  See id. at 605–06 (“We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the 
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information . . . . The right to collect and use such data 
for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to 
avoid unwarranted disclosures.”); EFF Brief, supra note 15, at 21–22 (citing cases including 
Whalen). 
 103.  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37. 
 104.  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 36–37. 
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crafting the putative right to informational privacy,105 Whalen cited 
Professor Kurland for the assertion that there are three facets of the 
right to privacy, one of which is the “right of the individual to be free 
in action, thought, experience, and belief from governmental 
compulsion.”106 Professor Kurland distinguished this right from “the 
right of an individual not to have his private affairs made public.”107 
Thus, Whalen, by relying on Professor Kurland for guidance, 
distinguished between freedom of action, which includes the 
compelled collection of information, and improper dissemination—
both of which implicate a putative right to informational privacy.108 
Similarly, Nixon concluded that the former president’s privacy 
rights were threatened the moment that he was forced to submit to 
collection of his personal papers.109 Nixon recognized that the 
collection threatened a privacy right simply by the submission of the 
papers to government employees110 who sorted the private 
documents from the public documents.111 Thus, even though there 
was no disclosure to the public because a statute required the former 
president’s private papers to be returned to him,112 Nixon nonetheless 
recognized that the short-term collection of personal papers 
threatened the former president’s privacy right.113 
 
 105.  The Court crafted the putative right from its previous decisions of Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); and others that delineated the 
right to privacy. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 n.23. 
 106.  Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24 (quoting Phillip Kurland, The Private I, UNIVERSITY OF 
CHICAGO MAGAZINE (Autumn 1976)). 
 107.  Id. (quoting Kurland, supra note 106). 
 108.  Id. at 599 & n.24, 600. 
 109.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457–58, 465 (1977) (“We may 
assume . . . that this pattern of de facto Presidential control and congressional acquiescence gives 
rise to appellant’s legitimate expectation of privacy in such materials.”). But the Nixon Court 
ultimately held that the public interest outweighed his privacy interest. Id. at 465. 
 110.  It is interesting to note that those employees had an “unblemished record . . . for 
discretion.” Id. at 465. 
 111.  Id. at 457–58 (discussing the problem of mingling personal documents with public 
documents and how this gives rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy); EFF Brief, supra note 
15, at 22. 
 112.  The statute at issue in Nixon was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation 
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006). 
 113.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458–59. “The very fact that the Court considered whether Nixon’s 
informational privacy rights had been violated, when public dissemination was not an issue, lends 
strong support to the notion that informational privacy concerns may be triggered by the mere 
collection of information.” Russell T. Gorkin, Comment, The Constitutional Right to 
Informational Privacy: NASA v. Nelson, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 1, 7 
(2010). Nixon, which focused on a Fourth Amendment claim, never went on to analyze the 
former president’s claim that his privacy interest was threatened by the collection of information, 
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Interestingly, the Court in Nelson did acknowledge that Whalen 
and Nixon each conceded that collection of information might 
threaten a putative privacy interest.114 The Court stated, “Both 
Whalen and Nixon recognized that government ‘accumulation’ of 
‘personal information’ for ‘public purposes’ may pose a threat to 
privacy.”115 But the Court did not apply that precedent to determine 
whether the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the privacy interest 
that was threatened by the compelled collection of the Employees’ 
information.116 Instead, the Court jumped to its determination of 
whether the Privacy Act’s statutory protections alleviated the entirety 
of the Employees’ privacy claims because the Privacy Act 
sufficiently protected against unwarranted dissemination.117 
Had the Court acknowledged that the compelled collection of 
information threatened the Employees’ informational privacy 
interest, the Court would have been faced with the question of 
whether the Privacy Act sufficiently protects that interest.118 Simply 
put, the Privacy Act does not. Its requirements for collection are too 
broad for it to protect against the threats to privacy that are created 
by the compelled collection of personal information.119 The Privacy 
Act’s two main requirements for collection are: (1) the information 
collected must be “relevant and necessary” to accomplish a purpose 
of the agency that is required by law; and (2) the agency, “to the 
greatest extent practicable[,]” should attempt to collect information 
directly from the individual.120 
 
and therefore never answered the question of “what information an individual can prohibit the 
government from collecting, and when, if it all, this prohibition can be overcome.” Id.; see Nixon, 
433 U.S. at 460. 
 114.  Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2011). 
 115.  Id. (citing Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457–58; Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977)). 
 116.  See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[H]ere, no less than in Whalen and Nixon, the 
information collected is shielded by statute from ‘unwarranted disclosur[e].’ The Privacy Act, 
which covers all information collected during the background-check process, allows the 
Government to maintain records ‘about an individual’ only to the extent the records are ‘relevant 
and necessary to accomplish’ a purpose authorized by law.” (citations omitted)). 
 117.  Id. at 761 (“Both Whalen and Nixon recognized that government ‘accumulation’ of 
‘personal information’ for ‘public purposes’ may pose a threat to privacy. But both decisions also 
stated that a ‘statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures’ generally allays these 
privacy concerns.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
 118.  See id. (reasoning that statutes may shield threats to privacy). 
 119.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (2006) (regulating the maintenance, manner of collection, and 
disclosure of personal information, but limiting the type of information that can be collected to 
that which is “relevant and necessary” to accomplish a purpose of the agency that is required by 
law). 
 120.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(2). 
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The Court did not address either requirement.121 As to the first, 
the Court repeatedly asserted that the questions were reasonable and 
related to employment,122 but it never deemed the collection to be 
relevant and necessary to an end that was required by law.123 As to 
the second requirement, the Government collected information from 
the Employees’ former landlords and references—information that it 
did not collect directly from the individuals.124 Still, given the 
Privacy Act’s vague language,125 in conjunction with the Court’s 
ultimate finding that the questions were reasonable,126 the Court 
might have held that the Government’s collection of information met 
the Privacy Act’s two requirements. 
But just because the Government satisfied the Privacy Act’s 
requirements did not guarantee that the Privacy Act did an adequate 
job of protecting the Employees’ privacy interest. Indeed, a recent 
study demonstrates that, despite the Privacy Act’s requirements, 
many agencies overcollect information because they do not assess 
the relevance of or need for such information.127 And the current 
degree of agency and congressional oversight is inadequate for 
agencies to determine what is actually relevant and necessary for 
them to prevent or remedy overcollection.128 Until Congress takes 
action and mandates more specific requirements for collection under 
 
 121.  See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762–63 (noting that the safeguards in the Privacy Act 
“‘evidence a proper concern’ for individual privacy” with respect to disclosure, without 
discussing whether or not such safeguards properly protect the individual’s privacy interest 
against compelled collection). 
 122.  Id. at 759–61 (repeating “reasonable”). 
 123.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). The Court denied that it had to determine whether the questions 
were necessary: “We reject the argument that the Government . . . has a constitutional burden to 
demonstrate that its questions are ‘necessary’ . . . .” Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 760. While there is a 
distinction between determining whether specific questions themselves were necessary and 
determining whether the collection of information was necessary, under the Court’s reasoning—
that proving that the questions were necessary was too great a burden—perhaps the Court would 
have found that collection was also not necessary and therefore did not meet the Privacy Act’s 
first requirement, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1). 
 124.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
 125.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)–(2) (using such terms as “relevant,” “necessary,” and “to the 
greatest extent practicable” without defining them or explaining what they mean). 
 126.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 759–61. 
 127.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 14–15. This is even more 
problematic for electronic records, which are easier to collect. Id. at 43; Leading Cases, supra 
note 92, at 238–39. 
 128.  Coles, supra note 72, at 990 (“Current oversight and enforcement efforts have been 
unsuccessful in preventing widespread abuse of the Privacy Act. Federal agencies have been 
unwilling to police themselves.”). 
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the Privacy Act,129 the only adequate protection is to not collect 
information in the first place because “information not collected 
about an individual cannot be misused.”130 
In sum, although the dissemination of personal information is 
often more intrusive than the collection of that information, “[w]hen 
the government compels individuals to relinquish control of sensitive 
personal information, the harm to personal dignity can be profound, 
regardless of how widely and to whom the information is later 
disseminated.”131 The Employees’ informational privacy right 
involved more than just an interest in limiting the dissemination of 
their personal information; their privacy right also included an 
interest in curtailing the collection of that information.132 The 
Privacy Act, however, does not adequately protect against threats to 
a putative right to information privacy that is implicated by the 
compelled collection of information. 
C.  The Privacy Act Does Not Adequately Protect  
a Right to Informational Privacy That Is Threatened 
 by the Improper Dissemination of Information 
The Privacy Act is also inadequate to protect the privacy interest 
that is threatened by improper, nonconsensual dissemination.133 The 
Privacy Act has twelve exceptions that swallow the rule against the 
nonconsensual dissemination of information.134 In particular, the 
 
 129.  Id. (“[T]he efforts of Congress . . . to provide guidance and to ensure compliance have 
met with limited success. . . . Ultimately, it is the flawed statutory enforcement and oversight 
scheme that is responsible for the failings of the Privacy Act.”). 
 130.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 14 (quoting Notice of Privacy Act 
Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28949, 28960 (July 9, 1975)). 
 131.  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 41, at 40. 
 132.  EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 11 (“[P]rivacy is not simply the limit on the disclosure of 
personal information.”). 
 133.  Another inadequacy—which should be noted but is not discussed at length in this 
Comment—is the lack of proper remedies for violations of the Privacy Act: individuals may only 
obtain monetary relief for intentional and willful violations. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (2006); Nat’l 
Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 763 n.15 (2011); Coles, supra note 72, at 
992–94 & n.236; Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1168 (2002); see also Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 616, 627 
(2004) (holding that plaintiffs must prove that some actual damages resulted from a federal 
agency’s intentional or willful violation of the Privacy Act of 1974 in order to qualify for the 
minimum award of $1,000 that the statute provides as compensation for such a violation). 
 134.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12); see also Lillian R. BeVier, Information About Individuals 
in the Hands of Government: Some Reflections on Mechanisms for Privacy Protection, 4 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 455, 479–80 (1995) (“[T]he Privacy Act is a paper tiger. . . . [T]he Act’s 
substantive provisions are riddled with loopholes and laced with exceptions.”). 
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routine-use exception that was at issue in Nelson “has threatened to 
emasculate the Privacy Act’s protection of individual privacy.”135 
The Court, in concluding that the Government’s established 
routine uses were not too broad, reasoned that those routine uses did 
not specifically authorize a release of the information to the public; 
instead, the Government released the information only to other 
employees and to the Employees’ references and landlords.136 
Although the Government’s routine uses did not facially permit a 
disclosure to the public, the Court’s conclusion—that there was 
necessarily only a remote possibility that the information could be 
disclosed to the public137—was flawed because it did not take into 
consideration the modern reality of the abuse of the exception.138 
In Nelson, the Government, in attempting to comply with the 
Privacy Act’s provisions,139 gave notice to the federal register and 
the Employees that its routine uses included disclosure for collection 
and disclosure for dissemination.140 The Court reasoned that these 
routine uses were “limited, reasonable steps designed to complete the 
background-check process in an efficient and orderly manner.”141 
Moreover, because only references and other employees could 
review the information, the Court concluded that “[t]he ‘remote 
possibility’ of public disclosure created by these narrow ‘routine 
use[s]’ does not undermine the Privacy Act’s substantial 
protections.”142 
As the Court noted, an “ironclad disclosure bar” is unnecessary 
to protect an informational privacy interest.143 The routine-use 
exception, however, is far from ironclad. And the Court’s reliance on 
Whalen and Nixon—for the assertion that protections do not need to 
be ironclad144—is undermined by several distinctions between those 
cases and Nelson. First, neither of the earlier cases dealt with the 
 
 135.  Coles, supra note 72, at 959. 
 136.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  The routine-use exception has long been criticized as the exception that swallows the 
rule. E.g., Solove, supra note 133, at 1167–68. 
 139.  See supra note 82. 
 140.  NASA Notice of Proposed Revisions, supra note 84 (listing routine uses in Appendix 
B). 
 141.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 763. 
 142.  Id. (alteration in original) (citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–02 (1977)). 
 143.  Id. at 762. 
 144.  Id. 
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Privacy Act or its exceptions. The statutes in Whalen and Nixon had 
their own distinct exceptions to nondisclosure.145 The statutory 
exceptions that permitted disclosure in Whalen and Nixon, therefore, 
had no bearing on whether the routine-use exception at issue in 
Nelson was too porous to protect a privacy interest.146 Second, 
neither Whalen nor Nixon dealt with dissemination to persons outside 
of the agency; rather, the exception in each case was for 
dissemination to other employees.147 But in Nelson, one of the 
Government’s routine-use exceptions permitted disclosure to 
nonemployees such as references and former landlords.148 Finally, 
there was no evidence that the other NASA employees, unlike the 
employees in Nixon, had spotless records.149 Thus, while there may 
have been only a remote possibility of public disclosure given the 
narrow exceptions in Whalen and Nixon, those exceptions are distinct 
from the Privacy Act’s routine-use exception. Therefore, it does not 
necessarily follow that there was only a remote possibility of public 
disclosure in Nelson. 
Moreover, criticism of the routine-use exception is 
widespread.150 Essentially, the exception only requires agencies to 
plan in advance for disclosure and to comply with minimal 
procedural requirements.151 Thus, it threatens to eliminate one of the 
Privacy Act’s central purposes: to protect individual privacy 
rights.152 As noted, agencies must meet minimal requirements, 
including reviewing routine-use disclosures by keeping a record.153 
 
 145.  The statute in Whalen was N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371 (McKinney 1973). Whalen, 
429 U.S. at 594 & n.12 (listing nondisclosure exceptions, including disclosure to employees). The 
statute in Nixon was the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. 
§ 2107 (1970). Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 429, 431 (1977). 
 146.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 762 (“[T]oo porous to supply a meaningful check against 
‘unwarranted disclosures.’” (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605)). 
 147.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462 (describing the archivists’ screening and collection procedures 
pursuant to their authority under 44 U.S.C. § 2107); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 594 & n.12 (citing N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3371). 
 148.  Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 753. 
 149.  Nixon, 433 U.S. at 462 (“[U]nblemished record for discretion.” (quoting Nixon v. 
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 408 F. Supp. 321, 365 (D.D.C. 1976))). 
 150.  E.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Participation: Personal Information and Public 
Sector Regulation in the United States, 80 IOWA L. REV. 553, 584–86 (1995) (“Not only is the 
‘routine use’ exemption applied in a fashion that ignores relevant statutory language, such agency 
practice continues despite prolonged and well-placed criticism of it.”). 
 151.  Major John F. Joyce, The Privacy Act: A Sword and a Shield but Sometimes Neither, 99 
MIL. L. REV. 113, 157 (1983). 
 152.  Coles, supra note 72, at 979–80. 
 153.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(1) (2006). 
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Some agencies fail to adhere to this requirement.154 For example, one 
report found that, in 2,400 different systems of records, 18 percent of 
agencies did not review routine-use disclosures to ensure that the 
disclosures continued to comply with the purposes for which the 
information had been collected.155 Given this abuse of the exception, 
“agencies cannot assure the public that the potential uses of their 
personal information remains appropriate.”156 Moreover, although an 
agency must give notice of routine uses,157 it has become common 
for agencies to eliminate the effectiveness of this requirement by 
broadly wording their routine-use notices.158 As agencies craft their 
own routine uses, which are subject only to the vague requirement 
that the uses be compatible with the purpose for which the records 
had been originally collected,159 they can essentially create their own 
exceptions to the Privacy Act’s prohibition against nonconsensual 
disclosure.160 Thus, even though the Government’s routine uses did 
not explicitly permit disclosure to the public, the Court should not 
have ignored the reality of the abuse of the routine-use exception and 
the potential for disclosure to the public. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Perhaps the Court should not have even continued Whalen and 
Nixon’s tradition of assuming, without deciding, that a constitutional 
right to informational privacy exists.161 But because the Court in 
Nelson did just that, it had to ascertain whether any statutory 
requirements shielded the Employees’ putative right to informational 
privacy. Nelson’s holding hinged on the assertion that, like the 
statutory protections in Whalen and Nixon, the Privacy Act’s 
 
 154.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 17, 50. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 17. 
 157.  The agency must give notice to the federal register, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(D), and to 
individuals who provide information, id. § 552a(e)(3)(C). 
 158.  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 70, at 50. 
 159.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). 
 160.  EPIC Brief, supra note 78, at 25–26. 
 161.  “Thirty-three years have passed since the Court first suggested that the right may, or 
may not, exist. It is past time for the Court to abandon this Alfred Hitchcock line of our 
jurisprudence.” Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). But see Leading Cases, supra note 92, at 232 (“Although Nelson may not answer 
many of the questions that persist about informational privacy, the Court correctly declined to 
dictate the contours of that right at a time when its practical and legal implications remain 
difficult to anticipate.”). 
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requirement against nonconsensual public disclosure was adequate to 
protect the Employees’ informational privacy interest. But the Court 
did not address how the Privacy Act warded off the privacy threat 
that was created by the background check’s collection of personal 
information. Moreover, the Court failed to acknowledge the reality 
that the Privacy Act’s routine-use exception swallows the rule 
against nonconsensual public disclosure, thereby causing 
dissemination of more personal information than the Privacy Act 
actually intended to allow. Consequently, the Court should not have 
held that the Privacy Act sufficiently protected the Employees’ 
putative constitutional right to informational privacy that was 
implicated by the Government’s background checks. If, as will likely 
happen, background checks and compelled collection of information 
become more widespread,162 then Nelson will be even more 
meaningful to citizens and their “interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.”163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 162. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 758 (“[M]ore than 88% of U.S. companies . . . perform background 
checks on their employees.” (alteration in original) (quoting Brief Amicus Curiae of Consumer 
Data Industry Ass’n et al. in Support of Petitioners at 2, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (09-530), 2010 
WL 2185134, at *2)); John E. Matejkovic & Margaret E. Matejkovic, Whom to Hire: Rampart 
Misrepresentations of Credentials Mandate the Prudent Employer Make Informed Hiring 
Decisions, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 827, 829 (2006) (“82% of employers surveyed in 2003 
conducted applicant background investigations, up from 66% in 1996.” (citing How to Do 
Background Checks Properly, HRFOCUS, Aug. 1, 2004, at 11)). 
 163.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 
589, 599 (1977). 
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